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Abstract:
This study presents a framework to understand and explain the design and configuration of digital payment platforms
and how these platforms create conditions for market entries. By embracing the theoretical lens of platform
envelopment, we employed a multiple and comparative-case study in a European setting by using our framework as
an analytical lens to assess market-entry conditions. We found that digital payment platforms have acquired market
entry capabilities, which is achieved through strategic platform design (i.e., platform development and service
distribution) and technology design (i.e., issuing evolutionary and revolutionary payment instruments). The studied
cases reveal that digital platforms leverage payment services as a mean to bridge and converge core and adjacent
platform markets. In so doing, platform envelopment strengthens firms’ market position in their respective core
markets. This study contributes to the extant literature on digital platforms, market entries, and payment.
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Towards a Market Entry Framework for Digital Payment Platforms

Introduction

The digital-payment landscape is a crowded place. New payment actors with different industry
backgrounds (e.g., retail) and novice start-ups are attempting to gain a foothold in the once-protected
payment market. In so doing, new payment actors are betting on various technologies (e.g., near field
communication (NFC)) to connect payers and payees in novel ways. These new dynamics in the payment
market are largely driven by falling operating costs (as new payment actors leverage on agile and
affordable cloud systems) but, more importantly, by regulation. European policymakers introduced new
regulations to reduce market-entry barriers for new payment actors to foster competition, innovation, and
consumer welfare (European Commission, 2009).
To illustrate the competitive market space, AngelList, a well-known service for connecting start-ups with
investors, lists about 996 U.S. and European mobile payment start-ups (AngelList, 2015) without including
established actors such as MasterCard, PayPal or Visa. As more actors enter the payment market to
diversify risk and tap into new business opportunities, payment actors increasingly find themselves in a
saturated market space, which, in turn, transforms payment into a commoditized service. For instance,
new actors (e.g., start-ups) deconstruct existing payment value streams (e.g., customer relationships) to
their own benefit, which clearly challenges the business logic of incumbents in their own core markets.
As existing payment business models become less profitable (e.g., payment fee business models),
payment actors have to explore new revenue sources. One avenue lies in creating entirely new markets
by creating new products and services that have not existed before (Christensen & Bower, 1996;
Schumpeter, 1962). Another way is the entry into existing markets, where products and services are
based on proven business logics. Creating new markets, however, bears many risk factors (e.g.,
predicting demand). On the contrary, risk-averse organizations generally find entering existing markets
more amenable since they can more easily predict risk, market size, and competitive positioning. In
platform-driven markets (e.g., payment markets), a predominant way to enter other existing markets is via
platform envelopment (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). Platform envelopment prescribes that
owners of digital platforms equip their existing user bases (e.g., payers, payees) with new services (e.g.,
mobile ticketing) to bridge them into other existing platform markets (e.g., public transportation). In other
words, platform envelopment refers to leveraging an installed user base and complementary services to
enter other existing platform markets.
Digital platforms drive many markets, such as the payment market. Digital platforms are layered, modular
technology artifacts (Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010) that have the logic to match different users (e.g.,
payers and payees) to derive business value (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Stabell &
Fjeldstad, 1998). Because these layered, modular IT artifacts create value through mediation, digital
platforms are considerably sophisticated in their technology attributes. Contemporary digital platforms
(e.g., PayPal) are equipped with application programming interfaces (APIs), which are access and
distribution points for internally or externally developed services. Furthermore, digital platforms deliver
services increasingly through physical means (e.g., mobile phones), which, in essence, represent physical
proxies of digital platforms. Take PayPal as an example of a digital payment platform owner: PayPal offers
APIs to third parties (e.g., app developers) to integrate payment functionalities into their own mobile
services. In this way, PayPal empowers third parties’ business, which ultimately supports PayPal’s goal to
increase its footprint in the payment market.
Based on the abovementioned observations, payment platforms comprise various components (e.g., APIs
and mobile phones) in delivering their services. Accordingly, to support conditions for platform
envelopment, one has to accordingly design and configure platforms and their corresponding components
in the first place. Platform envelopment, however, is a complex task and novel for some prior protected
markets, such as the traditional payment market. As new payment actors with different industry
backgrounds encroach the payment market and, thereby, disturb market equilibrium, established payment
actors in their core markets are compelled to respond to remain relevant. To shed light on platform
envelopment in the payment market, we study and explain how digital platforms leverage payment
services as a mean to enter other existing platform markets. Thus, we investigate:
RQ:

How are digital payment platforms designed and configured to create conditions for platform
envelopment?

To answer the research question, we draw on pertinent literature on 1) multi-sided platforms (Eisenmann
et al., 2006; Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b), 2) technology standards (Besen & Farrell,
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1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; West & Dedrick, 2000), and 3) platform envelopment (Eisenmann et al.,
2011). Accordingly, we provide insights and conceptual clarity on different design and configuration
options to acquire platform-envelopment capabilities to enter other existing platform markets.
Our findings suggest that digital platforms create conditions for platform envelopment by leveraging
payment services as a mean to bridge and converge core and adjacent platform markets. In so doing, the
design and configuration of digital platforms and their corresponding components (e.g., payment
instruments) have an impact on their market-entry capabilities. Because we have a platform-envelopment
(i.e., the entry into existing markets) and platform-centric approach, we exclude end users and new
market creation from our analysis.
In providing a framework to study the design and configuration of digital payment platforms, we contribute
to the digital platform and payment literature by creating a descriptive and explanatory theory (Gregor,
2006). Specifically, this paper contributes to the platform market-entry literature (Eisenmann et al., 2011)
by demonstrating how one can achieve the conditions for platform envelopment in the payment market.
We are not aware of prior research that studies specifically the design and configuration of digital payment
platforms to acquire platform-envelopment conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the study’s theoretical background. In Section 3,
we present our framework by synthesizing key concepts that others have identified as being important in
designing multi-sided payment platforms and how one can successfully enter platform markets. In Section
4, we present our research method. In Section 5, we analyze eight different European payment platforms.
In Section 6, we synthesize our findings, discuss our limitations, and propose promising areas for further
research. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.

2

Theoretical Background

In this section, we review pertinent literature to study and understand platform market entries. We focus
specifically on the concept of platform envelopment (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Platform envelopment is a
theoretical lens that originates from studies on network theory in industrial organization economics (Katz &
Shapiro, 1985). Platform envelopment prescribes that firms in value networks (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998)
enter into other platform markets by leveraging service-bundling and network effects. We also discuss the
payment literature through the conceptual lens of multi-sided platforms (Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Rochet &
Tirole, 2003b). We selected the multi-sided platform literature based on the notion that payment services
(e.g., PayPal) are, in essence, manifestations of multi-sided platforms that have the function to connect
and equip various platform stakeholders. Moreover, multi-sided payment platforms have the technological
capability to provide bundled services, which is amenable with the concept of platform envelopment to
enter other platform markets.

2.1

Business Design: Platform Market Entry

Firms constantly face complex and hyper-competitive business environments (D'Aveni, Canger, & Doyle,
1995) in gaining or maintaining market leadership. Firms enter markets to increase business value,
reduce competitive pressure, or diversify risk (Porter, 1980; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000, p. 1107) define dynamic capabilities as “organizational and strategic routines by which firms
achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die”. In this sense,
firms’ dynamic capabilities play a vital role because it enables an organization to reconfigure existing
resources and capabilities to achieve organizational goals, such as market entry (Eisenhardt & Martin,
2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).
In value chain-dominated markets (e.g., manufacturing), firms enter and compete by converting inputs into
valued market outputs in a sequential manner (e.g., outputs based price or quality) (Porter, 1985). In
platform-driven markets (e.g., payment), however, firms create value and compete through efficient
mediated products or services (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). Industrial organization
research (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b) suggests that firms in platform markets obtain
their competitiveness by having the capability to induce positive network effects. Specifically, competitive
platform firms design their offerings in a way that creates reciprocal business value among different types
of users (e.g., payer and payee) that, in turn, creates a self-reinforcing and expanding network effects. In
other words, the stronger and durable the network effects are, the more dominant the firm becomes. In
this sense, aspiring and existing platform firms need to strategically design their platform resources to
ensure conditions for positive network effects in markets.
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Few studies have focused on entering the platform market (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Gawer and
Henderson (2007) studied the chip manufacturer Intel and its decision about whether or not to enter the
adjacent markets of third party providers. It decided to do so because 1) it had the organizational
capabilities to serve these markets and 2) the adjacent markets were characterized by high growth, which,
in turn, could support Intel’s business in its core market (i.e., computer chips). Intel was concerned about
losing its market leadership towards upcoming and dominating third parties. These upcoming third parties
could, in turn, dictate a new PC design (e.g., support of other chips) that could challenge Intel’s business
in its core market. In this sense, Intel entered into adjacent platform markets to solidify its position in its
core market.
Besides protecting core markets, market saturation is another driver to enter (platform) markets.
Burgelman and Grove (2007), who studied Apple as a “cross-boundary disrupter” (i.e., from the computer
to the music and mobile phone industry), suggest that Apple was compelled to explore new revenue
sources as its high-end computer market became increasingly saturated. Apple recognized opportunities
in the music and mobile phone industry, which, in turn, could indirectly support Apple’s computer business
line. Literature on platform market entry illustrates that firms enter into adjacent (e.g., Intel) or unrelated
markets (e.g., Apple) to remain competitive. Platform firms that may lose the ability to define and protect
their core markets could share IBM’s fate. IBM was once the dominant actor in the PC market but failed to
defend its core business as third parties (e.g., Microsoft) originating from other markets (e.g., operating
systems) took the lead to define what a PC constitutes (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002, p. 29). History
demonstrates that digital platforms likewise have to evaluate their organizational resources and
capabilities as markets change, emerge, or collide.

2.2

Market Entry through Platform Envelopment

Entering platform markets is particularly challenging for platform firms. Platform markets are sheltered by
switching costs and network effects that enact barriers for other platform firms to enter markets (Chen &
Hitt, 2002; Eisenmann et al., 2006, 2011; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). One way for platform firms to overcome
market-entry barriers is in platform envelopment. Platform envelopment refers to leveraging an existing
user base (e.g., payers, payees) by bundling a current platform service (e.g., mobile payment) with
another service (e.g., mobile ticketing) (Eisenmann et al., 2011). In this sense, previously single-purpose
platforms convert into multi-purpose platforms and, thus, simultaneously serve users with different needs
(e.g., commuting). Compared to single-purpose platforms, multi-purpose platforms have the competitive
advantage to entice new users from other platform services that are designed for a single purpose (see
Figure 1). Specifically, multi-purpose platforms provide function overlaps, which may entice users to join
multi-purpose platforms and abandon prior single-purpose platforms (Eisenmann et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, single-purpose platforms can counteract platform envelopment by offering a matching
service to increase market-entry barriers (Nalebuff, 2004).

Figure 1. Platform Envelopment

Platform envelopment is already pervasive in the payment industry. Take PayPal as an example: in the
beginning, PayPal was purely on online payment service provider that connected payers and payees on
ecommerce websites (e.g., eBay). However, PayPal started to evolve by entering the physical payment
market by bundling existing payment terminals with PayPal software (Verifone, 2012). By leveraging its
large user base, PayPal attempted to encroach the retail payment market in brick-and-mortar stores. In
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addition, PayPal collects highly valuable payment data to provide additional value-added services (e.g.,
customer analytics), an area dominated by credit card firms. With its large user base, PayPal has the
attributes to be a platform enveloper for large credit card networks.

2.2.1

Payment as Multi-sided Platforms

Most payment services are based on a four-party scheme (i.e., payer, payee, acquirer, card issuer),
where these actors process payment transactions through orchestrated business models. To have access
to these payment services, payment actors are technically and commercially affiliated to a digital payment
platform (e.g., VISA) that prescribes authorized payment instruments (e.g., NFC payment cards) and
binding business agreements (e.g., payment fees). Scholars have studied payment services through the
theoretical lens of two-sided platforms or markets that need to attract and match two types of users to
create value (Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003b).
In the payment context, these user types are typically payers (e.g., cardholders) and payees (e.g.,
merchants). We adopt Hagiu and Wright’s (2011, p. 2) definition for a multi-sided platform: “an
organization that creates value primarily by enabling direct interactions between two (or more) distinct
types of affiliated customers”. Primarily, platforms coordinate and facilitate direct interactions in a
controlled manner that provides the architecture and a set of rules (Eisenmann et al., 2006). In the
payment context, these are efficient connections between payers and payees, which is achieved through
the technical means of digital payment platforms (Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003a, 2003b, 2006).
Research has emphasized that a payment platform’s viability largely depends on whether it creates
positive network effects whereby each additional user on one side (e.g., payer) adds demand on the other
side (payee) (Rochet & Tirole, 2002). To ensure that initial positive network effects can occur, payment
platforms mostly subsidize one side (e.g., payers with free payment instruments) to create a critical user
base, which, in turn, attracts the revenue side (e.g., payees) (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Evans &
Schmalensee, 2005). Figure 2 demonstrates the notion and logic of a two-sided (single-purpose) and
multi-sided (multi-purpose) digital payment platform.

Figure 2. Two Types of Digital Payment Platforms

Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2006, p. 347) were among the first scholars to coin the term multi-sided
payment platforms in studying the historical failure of “smart cards” in the U.S. payment market. Smart
cards were novel and advanced payment instruments at their time. However, smart card proponents faced
considerable challenges. Compared to the magnetic-stripe payment card, smart cards were more
sophisticated payment instruments because they had a built-in computer chip that could store and
execute Java applications. Furthermore, smart cards and their corresponding systems could use APIs.
APIs enabled smart card providers to offer payment and payment-unrelated services, which gave them
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the ability to operate beyond the payment market. However, the initial attempt to introduce smart cards
failed. The inability to mobilize a critical user base on the payment side (i.e., the lack of users with smart
cards and compatible payment terminals) and on the software side (i.e., lack of software) has resulted in
the classic chicken-and-egg problem.

2.2.2

Governance of Digital Payment Platforms

Because contemporary digital payment platforms inherently have the capability to offer multiple services
to different markets, digital payment platforms face the new and challenging task of governance. In the
past, payment platforms were largely closed IT systems with rigid, few, or no access points. New digital
payment platforms, however, are altering this notion because they provide third parties with access
opportunities via APIs. As such, platform governance, which refers to managing third parties and their
corresponding services, arises (Boudreau, 2010; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013). The technical and
cultural shift in providing access to previously closed financial systems has a considerable impact on
platform development from an internal viewpoint and on how services are distributed. Specifically, digital
payment platforms have taken the new role to consider how deep the technical involvement with third
parties should be to maintain platform control and resiliency. Another question is how to distribute services
that third parties develop (i.e., moderated or unmoderated)? Most digital payment platforms have not
explored the integration and governance of third party services, which ultimately effects service variety
and the entry into different markets.
To summarize, past studies have laid the conceptual foundation to understand digital payment platforms
as a multi-sided phenomenon, which have the capability to distribute multiple services to different users in
platform-driven markets. By supporting and distributing payment-unrelated services, digital payment
platforms can enter other platform markets, which corresponds to the notion of platform envelopment
(Eisenmann et al., 2011).
In extending the literature that we reference above, in Section 3, we propose a framework that
incorporates the aforementioned theories and concepts. First, we showcase different platform governance
schemes (i.e., platform design) based on platform development and service distribution. Secondly, we
leverage the technology standards literature to understand payment instruments in regards to
compatibility (i.e., technology design). Technology compatibility is key in competitive technology-driven
markets because it impacts market access and one’s ability to create network effects.

3

Digital Payment Platform Design Framework

In this section, we present our framework (see Figure 4) that incorporates business design (i.e., platform
envelopment) from Section 2 with platform design (i.e., platform governance) and technology design (i.e.,
technology standards). By embracing the contextual lens of digital payments, we argue that digital
payment platforms can create conditions for platform envelopment by strategically designing and
configuring platform- and technology-design elements to enter platform markets (i.e., business design).
We exclude payers and payees in this study because we focus on digital payment platforms and their
corresponding payment instruments. We are aware that payers and payees are subject to network effects
and switching and homing costs (Kazan & Damsgaard, 2013), and we realize that a payment platform is
sine qua none without the payers and payees; however, we investigate the design logic of payment
platforms and their corresponding instruments in achieving platform-envelopment conditions. Prior studies
have indeed investigated the design of digital payment platforms from different research angles (e.g.,
architecture, adoption patterns, platform ignition) and focused largely on the competitive dynamics within
the payment market (Kazan & Damsgaard, 2014; Mallat, 2007; Ondrus, Gannamaneni, & Lyytinen, 2015;
Ozcan & Santos, 2014). However, we study specifically how digital payment platforms are designed and
configured to create platform-envelopment conditions to enter other existing platform markets.

3.1

Platform Design: Platform Development and Service Distribution

Digital platforms apply different types of governance schemes on third parties while interacting with them
to create and capture value. To make sense of different governance schemes, we adapted Iyer and
Henderson’s (2010) API management framework, which is a suitable theoretical lens to analyze and
understand different types of governance schemes a platform owner can apply. Figure 3 illustrates that a
digital payment platform may exercise 1) monopolistic power or collaboration with third parties in
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developing the platform (i.e., closed or open) and 2) different ways for distributing platform services
developed by third parties to the market (i.e., moderated or unmoderated).

Figure 3. Platform Design

Platform development: we define platform development as the degree to which digital payment platforms
and third parties co-develop and maintain a digital payment platform. Payment platforms that follow the
closed development approach exercise monopolistic power in developing their platform and exclude third
party participation. Barclays’ mobile payment service “Pingit” represents such a payment platform. On the
contrary, open platform development involves third parties (i.e., platform co-development). For instance,
the payment start-up Stripe has a presence on GitHub.com, which is an online forum and repository
service for sharing code. By being active on GitHub.com, Stripe invites third party developers to come up
with new ideas and solutions to co-develop Stripe’s platform further in a moderated manner.
Service distribution: we define platform service distribution as the ability and the degree of freedom that
a payment platform grants third parties to distribute their own services. The moderated service distribution
approach enables payment platforms to exercise control on third party service distribution. Barclays’
mobile payment service Pingit, for instance, has moderated APIs, which grants authorized third parties
access to their APIs. The unmoderated approach allows third parties the freedom to distribute their own
services without platform approval. Coinkite, a Canadian Bitcoin merchant service that offers open and
permissionless API towards third parties that does not interfere in their service provisioning, illustrates an
unmoderated approach.
Based on these concepts, we can derive four different and generic platform governance schemes, which
we define as platform design options (see Figure 3):
1. The open and unmoderated platform approach allows the highest degree of freedom to modify a
payment platform and to distribute services without approval (e.g., Bitcoin).
2. The closed and moderated approach represents a closed system that excludes third parties from
developing the platform. The distribution of third party services is moderated (e.g., Pingit).
3. The open and moderated strategy allows third parties to assist in developing the platform;
however, the platform moderates service distribution (e.g., Stripe).
4. Lastly, the closed and unmoderated approach allows third parties to distribute services without
approval. However, third parties cannot develop the platform (e.g., Coinkite).

3.1.1

Payment Platform Design Implications

Each of these four platform design options has its benefits and shortcomings. The closed and moderated
approach requires a digital payment platform to have the organizational capabilities to review and
distribute platform services, especially as the number of third party services grows (cf. Iyer & Henderson,
2010). Furthermore, payment platforms have to consider the risks of competing against their own user
base (i.e., third parties), which may takeover valuable customer relationships (cf. Gawer & Cusumano,
2002, p. 29). The open and unmoderated approach may lead to permissionless and innovative platform
developments and uncontrolled service distributions, but it bears the risk of fragmentation, which may
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impact the platform’s reputation and its incentive to develop services (Boudreau, 2012; West & Gallagher,
2006). Platform design has an impact on the quantity, quality, and distribution of platform services, which
ultimately determines how effectively the platform can acquire platform-envelopment conditions on the
platform-design level. Next, we portray different payment instruments, which are physical proxies and
components of digital payment platforms, and discuss their implications for technology compatibility and
entering the platform market.

3.2

Technology Design: Compatibility of Digital Payment Instruments

Technology standards (or dominant design) are a set of rules that provide compatibility and
interoperability between different components (Chen & Forman, 2006; Weitzel, Beimborn, & König, 2006).
Various payment providers compete to establish a dominant design for payment instruments to obtain a
favorable market position (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Suárez & Utterback, 1995). A standardized payment
instrument, which is basically a proxy of a payment platform (e.g., a payment card), allows the platform
owner to reap economy-of-scale gains, gain positive network effects, and reach and serve an existing
user base (e.g., merchants with their existing payment terminals). However, to establish a technology
standard, temporary standard fragmentations and intended technology incompatibilities occur, which
creates a competitive cycle of market inclusion and exclusion (cf. Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Utterback
& Suárez, 1993).
One can classify physical devices as evolutionary or revolutionary devices in their attributes (Shapiro &
Varian, 1999). Evolutionary devices offer a migration path to a new technology and have simultaneously
backward compatibility to an existing standard system. The major benefit of these bridging technologies is
that they allow one to access an existing user base in specific markets and set the ground for future
technology transitions. For example, (plastic) payments cards are increasingly equipped with NFC chips
that are evolutionary in their technology design attributes because, with them, one can make contactless
payments. At the same time, NFC payment cards are backward compatible with existing payment
terminals based on chips and PIN. As such, evolutionary devices exhibit the attributes of incremental
innovation and, at the same time, compatibility with widely available technologies.
Revolutionary devices offer better performance and may provide a first-mover advantage. However,
releasing revolutionary devices to the market is a risky endeavor. First, the technology itself may be
incompatible with the prevalent industry standard and, hence, not accessible for a large user base.
Second, it is uncertain whether a revolutionary technology design will take off to create a critical user base
in the first place. In the payment context, mobile phones equipped with NFC chips have revolutionary
technology-design attributes because they offer superior payment experience and functionality compared
to payment cards (e.g., digital receipt management software). However, mobile payment based on NFC is
incompatible with widely available chip and PIN payment terminals, which reduces market access on the
merchant side. To illustrate different technology design options on the payer and payee side, Table 1
showcases four predominant payment instruments in the payment market (Smart Card Alliance, 2011). In
this study, payment instruments are evolutionary in their technology-design attributes if they are
compatible with widely available and existing devices between payers and payees. On the contrary,
payment instruments are revolutionary in their technology design attributes if they are incompatible with
widely available and existing devices between payers and payees. In this case, revolutionary technology
design requires the abolishment of existing payment instruments.
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SMS

Table 1. Technology Design of Payment Instruments
Payer

Payee

Technology design
(overall assessment)

Evolutionary

Evolutionary

Implications: evolutionary

Mobile payment based on SMS is
evolutionary and functions well with
existing and ordinary mobile phones
on the payer side.

SMS payments are compatible SMS payment is compatible between
both sides.
with existing payment terminals
(requires software update) on the
payee side.

Mobile card
reader

NFC

QR code

Evolutionary

3.2.1

Evolutionary

Mobile payment based on QR codes
QR code payments are
is evolutionary and functions with
compatible with existing payment
existing (camera-based) mobile
terminals (requires software
phones on the payer side.
update) on the payee side.

Implications: evolutionary
QR code payments are compatible
between both sides.

Evolutionary

Revolutionary

Implications: revolutionary

NFC payment cards is evolutionary
and uses the existing payment card
form factor.
NFC mobile payment is evolutionary
and uses the existing mobile phone
form factor on the payer side.

NFC payments are incompatible
with existing chip and PIN
payment terminals on the payee
side.

NFC payment technology is
incompatible between both sides.
Requires strong network effects on
the payee side to become a
prevalent payment instrument.

Evolutionary

Revolutionary

Implications: revolutionary

Mobile card readers are compatible
with existing payment cards
(magnetic stripe or chip/PIN) on the
payer side.

Mobile card readers are
incompatible with existing cardbased payment terminals on the
payee side.

Payment technology is incompatible
between both sides.
Requires strong network effects on
the payee side to become a
prevalent payment instrument.

Technology Design Implications

Digital payment platforms that issue revolutionary payment instruments might benefit from a first-mover
advantage to obtain a favorable market position compared to their competitors. However, platform users
may be not willing to incur the high adoption and switching costs (e.g., new payment terminals on the
payee side). Contrary, issuing an evolutionary payment instrument might be a safe bet to ensure market
compatibility and, thus, market access. For instance, banks are predetermined to offer new NFC payment
cards as an evolutionary payment instrument because the NFC payment card with its form factor is still
compatible with the prevalent card-based payment infrastructure. However, an evolutionary device
strategy built on shared technology standards represents a low barrier to keep competitors at a distance.
In regards to platform envelopment, the choice of technology has additional implications for market entry
that may serve either as an interface or obstacle to access platform markets from an operational
viewpoint. Take the versatile QR code technology as an example. Many payment services leverage the
QR code technology (i.e., evolutionary technology) to offer their mobile-payment service. At the same
time, the QR code technology is a standard in other industries, such as in the airline industry in the form of
mobile boarding passes. Accordingly, besides considering an evolutionary or revolutionary technology
design approach, the choice of certain payment technologies may impact market entry and, by that, the
convergence of platform markets in the first place (Besen & Farrell, 1994).

3.3

Market Entry of Digital Payment Platforms Framework

To understand how business, platform and technology design intertwine, Figure 4 overviews different
design and configuration options. To reach platform-envelopment conditions, a payment provider has
eight possible configuration options in entering existing platform-based markets. For completeness,
Schumpeterian innovation (i.e., new market creation) represents a subcategory of business design;
however, it is beyond our scope here.
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Figure 4. Digital Payment Platform: Eight Different Design Configurations Options

In Section 4, we present our research method and eight cases, the latter of which serve as illustrative
examples to demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of our proposed framework. Our framework’s
practicality lies in its analytical capabilities to identify commonalities and differences based on different
design and configuration options for digital payment platforms.

4

Research Method

We synthesize and consolidate key concepts and literature into the proposed digital platform-design
framework; as such, our approach is descriptive (i.e., theory type I) and explanatory (i.e., theory type II) in
nature (Gregor, 2006). The proposed framework serves as an analytical template for our empirical data
set, which we use both to understand how the three different design elements of a platform interrelate or
differ in a simultaneous manner (Kochen, 1985). To answer our research question, we performed a
multiple case study (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Yin, 2009) in a European setting. Employing a positivist
approach, we test our proposed framework on eight cases to identify platform-envelopment conditions. In
so doing, we do not seek statistical generalizability but rather analytical generalizability of our proposed
framework for different types of digital platforms (Yin, 2009).
The case study method has received ample attention in the IS community (Dubé & Paré, 2003), which has
the advantage to answer “how” and “why” questions in situations in which the researcher has limited or no
control over the study object (Yin, 2009). Because we analyze the logic of how digitals payment platforms
are designed to achieve platform-envelopment conditions, a multiple case study approach is suitable. By
analyzing the idiosyncrasies of different digital payment platforms, a multiple case study promises to yield
more general results (Yin, 2009) for understanding complex platform, technology, and business
structures.

4.1

Case Selection

We selected the cases based on several criteria: we focused on European companies that offer digital
and proximity-based payment instruments, payment actors with and without prior payment experience,
that provide sufficient online data to test our conceptual framework, and that have a promising future to
establish digital payment platforms based on their size or support from large firms. We divided the eight
cases into four categories based on their industry backgrounds. From these four categories, banks are,
according to our definition, the payment incumbents, whereas the other three actors (i.e., payment startups, merchants and mobile network operators) are new in the payment market and act as payment
envelopers. Note that the cases are illustrative examples that we use to showcase different design and
configuration options of digital payment platforms.
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Table 2. Eight Digital Payment Platforms
Banks

Mobile network operators

- Swish (Sweden)
- girogo (Germany)

4.2

- Orange (France)
- Turkcell (Turkey)

Merchants
- Yapital (Germany)
- Flash‘N pay (France)

Payment start-ups
- iZettle (Sweden)
- Payleven (Germany)

Data Collection

We collected publicly available data from different online sources: press releases, online news and
industry articles, interviews, and speeches at conferences. We searched for data via online industry and
technology magazines, search engines, and social media channels using certain relevant keywords:
“(NFC) mobile payment”, “NFC payment card”, “NFC Micro SD card”, “NFC SIM card”, “NFC phone
payment”, “mobile phone payment”, “contactless payment”, “QR code payments”, and “payment card
readers”. We limited the period to May 2011 to March 2013. Online industry and technology magazines
were particularly useful since they comprehensively cover factual reports on technological developments
in the retail and payment area with in-depth background knowledge and cross-checked sources. Eight
European companies emerged as we collected data due to large media coverage or their being leading
market actors in their original industries (e.g., the mobile network operator Turkcell) with the potential to
establish a dominant digital payment design. Table 3 presents the data sources we found.
We chose Web data because the selected digital payment systems were either planned, in the pilot stage,
or currently (at the time of writing) in severe competition with their rivals and because collecting primary
data through interviews is too sensitive and, thereby, partially inaccessible. Nevertheless, secondary data
has its merits in information systems (IS) research (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Romano, Donovan,
Hsinchun, & Nunamaker, 2003) because it avoids potential biases between interviewers and interviewees
as they mutually construct data (Silverman, 2006). Furthermore, secondary data is accessible and, more
importantly, verifiable through replication studies. However, to overcome potential biases in our data set,
we triangulated data from various publicly available Web sources (blogs, industry- and technologyfocused magazines, press releases, and payment conferences) to provide enough data for to illustrate our
conceptual framework.
Table 3. Data Sources for the Analysis
Data Sources

Description
•

Interviews

•
•

Press releases
Conference

Four interviews with Yapital’s CEO Nils Winkler:
• Two transcribed interviews by derhandel.de and etailment.de.
• Two interviews in video format by empiria group (DE) and paperJam TV (LU).
One transcribed interview by mobilemoneyrevolution.co.uk with Turkcell’s Cenk Bayrakdar,
Chief New Technology Businesses Officer.
One interview in video format by empiria group (DE) with Magnus Nilsson, iZettle’s CFO.

All press releases related to new payment instruments: girogo (3), Swish (5), Orange (3),
Turkcell (13), Yapital (13), Flash‘N pay (1), iZettle (21), and Payleven (13).
One of the authors attended the payment conference “The Nordic and Baltic CAC Mobile & NFC
Conference 2013”, where Swish provided insights during and after the presentation.

girogo (18), Swish (2), Orange (4), Turkcell (2), Yapital (1), Flash‘N pay (6), iZettle (9), and
Online articles and Payleven (7) (cisco.com, computersweden.se, derhandel.de, finextra.com, geldkarte.de,
reports
gsma.com, mobilepaymentstoday.com, nfctimes.com, nfcworld.com, spiegle.de,
telecompaper.com, techcrunch.com, thenextweb.com, welt.de, WSJ.com).
Local radio news

4.3

Two radio news and radio interview about girogo (DAS HITRADIO and ddp direct)

Data Analysis

We adopted a differentiated role strategy to analyze the data (Adler & Adler, 1988). The first author acted
as the primary data collector and coder. He was responsible for eliciting Web data sources, developing
the coding schemes, and mapping relevant quotes to each of the components in our proposed framework.
Conversely, the second author played the role of the devil’s advocate by coming up with alternative
interpretations and counterarguments.
To begin, the first author imported the Web data as PDF and audio files into Nvivo 10, a qualitative
analysis software program that allows one to collect and categorize data in a structured way. Then, the
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first author performed directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein,
1999). Directed content analysis is a suitable approach when prior or existing research about a
phenomenon is incomplete or requires further explanation; as such, this method helps to support or
extend key concepts and theories. Based on this notion, we initially derived coding categories from
existing research, which served as a theoretical guide during the analysis process.
To analyze the data, we used a coding scheme based on our conceptual framework, which we
synthesized from existing literature. Furthermore, we practiced flexible coding to capture prominent and
intriguing events that did not fit directly into the coding scheme. Nevertheless, flexible coding failed to yield
additional components beyond the proposed framework. As part of the coding process, the first author
constantly consulted with the second author about intermediate codes that emerged. Whenever
disagreements surfaced, we revisited and discussed the respective codes until we reached consensus.
The entire coding process followed an iterative cycle, and we finished analyzing the data only when we
agreed on the placement of quotes in accordance with the proposed framework. Table 4 overviews how
we coded one of the cases.
Table 4. Coding Sample
Framework
Frequency1
element

Platform
design

Technology
design

Business
design

5

Exemplary quote

3

“Putting the secure element inside the SIM
adds a very powerful layer of protection,”
says Hakan Tatlici, Product Manager for
Turkcell Wallet. “It’s like having a locked draw
in a desk inside a locked room. I don’t think
the others can compete with this.” (GSMA,
2013)

8

About SMS mobile payment:
“The advantage of such a service is that it is
useable by every mobile phone, so growing
the available audience for Turkcell’s Cuzdan
mobile wallet.” (Handford, 2013)

9

“Turkcell wants to introduce more
nonpayment applications, such as couponing,
loyalty and offers, which it sees as vital to
ensuring the success of its wallet and earning
more revenue for itself.” (Balaban, 2012)

Synthesis

Finding

The secure element on the
SIM card is a proprietary
Turkcell follows a closed
area to host third party
and moderated platform
services, which allows
design approach.
Turkcell to control third party
distribution.
Turkcell offers SMS mobile
payment, which ensures
compatibility with ordinary
mobile phones.

Turkcell issues
evolutionary mobile
payment instruments.

Turkcell bundles its mobile
Through bundling,
payment service with thirdTurkcell enters into other
party services, increasing
platform markets.
thereby its value proposition.

Eight Digital Payment Platforms

5.1
5.1.1

Banks
girogo (Germany)

The saving bank group Sparkasse, one of the largest financial institutions in Germany, initially equipped
1.5 million cardholders with NFC payment cards called girogo. The proprietary chip and PIN debit card
also featured a built-in NFC prepaid card with the NFC payment functionality’s tied to the prepaid payment
mode. On the merchant side, girogo payment cards are compatible with existing chip and PIN payment
terminals, but the NFC functionality stays dormant. Nevertheless, the NFC rollout was accompanied by
several retailers from various industries (e.g., gas stations to grocery stores) who showed their support by
replacing old terminals with new girogo-compatible ones (i.e., 12000 girogo-compatible payment terminals
by March 2015 of 720K in total in Germany (European Central Bank, 2012, p. 94)). To increase girogo’s
value proposition further, the Sparkassen group teamed up with a small number of soccer clubs to bundle
soccer season tickets with girogo payment cards, which allows soccer fans to enter the stadium and make
NFC payments at soccer games.

1

Number of relevant codes from data sample for a single case.
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Swish (Sweden)

Swish is a SMS-based mobile payment solution by a Swedish bank consortium comprising the six largest
banks in Sweden: Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Länsförsäkringar Bank, Nordea, SEB, and Swedbank.
By joining their forces, Swish has the ability to reach 94 percent of Swedish bank customers. Swish is a
mobile-payment application for Android, iOS, and Windows mobile phones and enables individuals and
merchants to make mobile payments between themselves. Swish users (i.e., individuals and businesses)
are asked to connect their mobile phone numbers with their existing bank accounts, which brings the
convenience that money is directly transferred to existing bank accounts and avoids any intermediaries.
Feature phones, which cannot install the Swish application, are still compatible with the Swish payment
platform though limited in their functionality in receiving payments. To date, Swish is purely a mobile
payment service without third party services and payment terminal integrations. In the latter case,
merchants accept Swish payments through their existing mobile phones.

5.2
5.2.1

Mobile Network Operators
Orange (France)

“Mobile NFC & Orange Money” is a proprietary NFC service by Orange, which is technically built on NFC
SIM cards. The mobile network operator issues circa five million new and replacement post-paid SIM
cards each year in hopes to equip 27 million customers with new payment instruments over the following
years. Orange emphasized that it does not have the ambition to roll out its own payment service; rather, it
considers itself a universal NFC hub for different contactless services. In doing so, Orange depends on
agreements with third party NFC providers, such as banks or public transport firms, to be a viable NFC
mobile platform service. On the merchant side, there are currently 300,000 contactless payment terminals
deployed (circa 1.8 million in total in France (European Central Bank, 2012, p. 94)), and future payment
terminals will be equipped with NFC functionalities.

5.2.2

Turkcell (Turkey)

In cooperation with the Turkish Yapi Kredit Bank and MasterCard, Turkcell, the largest mobile network
operator in Turkey with more than 34 million customers, launched its mobile-payment initiative called
Turkcell Cüzdan (Wallet), a mobile-payment service based on NFC. Initially, Turkcell issued smartphones
with built-in NFC chips that the Chinese handset manufacturer Huawei produced. For subscribers who do
not own NFC phones, NFC SIM cards served as a workaround solution. However, Turkcell acknowledged
that the NFC rollouts were taking longer than expected. To accelerate the adoption, Turkcell started to
offer a SMS person-to-person (P2P) payment service for mobile phones. In this context, mobile phone
numbers serve as accounts to settle payments among users or to withdraw cash at ATMs. On the
2
merchant side, Turkcell benefited from an existing NFC payment terminal infrastructure (66,000 units , 2.1
million terminals in total (Bank for International Settlements, 2013, p. 382)). Banks and terminal providers
hope to increase units up to two million over the next few years. Turkcell has been successful in teaming
up with third parties, such as Turkish banks (e.g., Akbank, Denizbank, İşbankası or Yapi Kredi, Garanti
Bank), to host their contactless services on Turkcell’s proprietary NFC SIM card. Turkcell is like Orange
France only an NFC hub for these payment services: Turkcell does not offer its own payment service.
Besides payments, Turkcell increases its value proposition by hosting loyalty programs or location-based
deals that inform subscribers about nearby deals. From these promotions, Turkcell receives a commission
of 10 percent for each purchased deal. Turkcell’s business model is based on a SIM rental model that
charges NFC service providers a monthly fee for hosting their NFC applications.

5.3
5.3.1

Merchants
Yapital (Germany)

OTTO, the second-largest online retailer after Amazon, launched its own payment solution called Yapital,
which is a mobile payment service based on QR codes. Yapital’s mobile payment platform is specifically
designed to be compatible with the existing payment terminals and smartphones. By updating the
software of ordinary chip and PIN payment terminals to display QR codes, updated payment terminals are
2

https://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns1058/Cisco_Turkcell_CS.pdf
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capable of processing Yapital payments. To date, the Görtz Group (shoe chain), SportScheck (sport
equipment), and Baur (online fashion and furniture store)—all subsidiaries of the OTTO Group—accept
Yapital. Furthermore, the parent company Yapital acquired the mobile commerce company NuBon, which
is a specialist for mobile loyalty and couponing. NuBon and Yapital have announced their intention to
exchange their know-how to offer a better and richer payment experience. At this stage, Yapital has acted
solely as a mobile payment service without any third party involvement.

5.3.2

Flash‘N pay (France)

The Auchan group, a French multinational retail group, developed and launched a QR code-based
mobile-payment solution called Flash‘N pay. Auchan hopes to create a mobile-payment standard across
the French retail industry by inviting other retailers to adopt Flash‘N pay. Developed for iOS handsets,
Flash‘N pay asks users to link their bank accounts and loyalty cards with it. To initiate payment
transactions, customers can scan QR codes at existing payment terminals. Users are also free to choose
to store any card by simply scanning the barcode of loyalty cards. Auchan emphasizes that its mobilepayment service is an independent solution and compatible with existing payment terminals (i.e., after a
software update), which allows them to circumvent the control of mobile network operators by using the
open QR code technology.

5.4
5.4.1

Payment Start-ups
iZettle (Europe)

The Swedish payment start-up iZettle, known as the “Square of Europe”, offers affordable mobile-payment
card readers aimed at merchants. The initial service is based on chip card readers (signature for
authentication) that transform existing iOS and Android mobile devices into mobile payment terminals by
simply plugging the card reader into the headphone jack. In February 2013, iZettle launched a more
secure version of its mobile card reader that supports chip and PIN payments, a common payment
method in Europe. The new card reader with a built-in keypad establishes via Bluetooth a connection with
ordinary mobile phones to process chip and PIN payments. To increase its payment ecosystem further,
iZettle offers permission-based APIs, which allows third party developers to integrate iZettle’s payment
functionalities into their own mobile applications. In this setting, iZettle processes payments in the
background.

5.4.2

Payleven (Europe)

Payleven is a Berlin-based payment start-up. Like its rival iZettle, Payleven offers mobile card readers for
Android and iOS mobile devices based for chip and PIN payments. As a side note, Payleven and iZettle
use the same payment hardware, which is a white-label solution from the same vendor. Payleven also
offers permission-based APIs that allows developers to integrate Payleven payment functionalities into
third party own apps.

5.5

Comparative Case Analysis

In Table 5, we analyze the cases to identify similarities and differences. The proposed framework (see
Figure 4) serves as our analytical lens to obtain insights into how digital payment platforms are designed
and configured that create conditions for platform envelopment.
Table 5. The Design and Configuration of Eight Digital Payment Platforms
Business design

Platform design
girogo

Market entry: NFC hub
girogo enters into the NFC
service provisioning market
by leveraging its existing
user base.
(Multi-sided payment
platform)

Volume 38

Closed & moderated
Girogo controls platform
development (closed) and
controls third party service
distribution (moderated).

Technology design

Industry configuration

Banks
Evolutionary
The NFC payment card is
Business design
compatible with existing chip In general, banks’ payment
and PIN terminals and uses platforms have the capability
the standard payment card
to enter other platform
form factor.
markets
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Swish
Closed
Market entry: not present
Swish’s controls platform
Swish operates only in the
development (closed). Being
payment market.
solely a payment service,
(Two-sided payment
there is no third party
platform)
service distribution.

Evolutionary
The mobile payment app
(SMS) is compatible with
existing mobile phones.

Platform design
Closed
Technology design
Evolutionary

Orange
Market entry: NFC hub
Orange enters into the NFC
service provisioning market
by leveraging its existing
user base.
(Multi-sided payment
platform)

Closed & moderated
Orange controls platform
development (closed) and
controls third party service
distribution (moderated).

Revolutionary
Mobile payments based on
NFC-SIM cards are
incompatible with chip and
PIN payment terminals.

Turkcell
Market entry: NFC hub
Turkcell enters into the NFC
service provisioning market
by leveraging its existing
user base.
(Multi-sided payment
platform)

Closed & moderated
Turkcell controls platform
development (closed) and
controls third party service
distribution (moderated).

Revolutionary
Mobile payments based on
NFC-SIM cards are
incompatible with chip & PIN
payment terminals.

Mobile network operators
Business Design
Both mobile network
operators enter into the
market of moderating NFC
services
Platform Design
Closed & moderated
Technology Design
Revolutionary

Yapital
Merchants
Closed
Evolutionary
Market entry: not present
Yapital controls platform
Mobile payment based on
Yapital operates only in the
Business design
development (closed). Being QR-Codes is compatible
payment market.
Flash‘N
pay enters the
solely a payment service,
with existing payment
(Two-sided payment
there is no third party
terminals and camera-based marketing market. However,
platform)
both parent companies
service distribution
mobile phones.
enter from the retail to the
Flash‘N pay
payment market.
Closed & unmoderated
Market entry: marketing
Evolutionary
Platform design
Flash‘N pay controls
Flash‘N pay’s enters the
Mobile payment based on
Closed
platform development
marketing market with
QR codes is compatible with
(closed). The distribution of
Technology design
loyalty card offerings.
existing payment terminals
loyalty cards does not
Evolutionary
(Multi-sided payment
and camera-based mobile
require approval
platform)
phones.
(unmoderated).
iZettle
Market entry: not present
iZettle operates only in the
payment market.
(Two-sided payment
platform)

Payment start-ups

Closed & moderated
Revolutionary
iZettle controls platform
iZettle’s mobile card readers
development (closed) and
are incompatible with chip &
controls third party services
PIN payment terminals.
distribution (moderated).
Payleven

Market entry: not present
Payleven operates only in
the payment market.
(Two-sided payment
platform)

Closed & moderated
Payleven controls platform
development (closed) and
controls third party service
distribution (moderated).

Revolutionary
Payleven’s mobile card
readers are incompatible
with chip & PIN payment
terminals.

Business design
Four of the eight digital
payment platforms enter into
other existing platform
markets.

Platform design
Closed and moderated is
the dominant platformdesign approach among
payment platforms.

Technology design
Technology design is
balanced between
evolutionary & revolutionary
payment instruments.
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Discussion

By embracing platform envelopment as our theoretical lens (Eisenmann et al., 2011), we study how digital
payment platforms are designed and configured to enter other platform markets. We analyze eight digital
payment platforms, six of which originate from different industries or were new actors in the payment
market. We glean insights about how platforms are developed (i.e., closed or open) and how services are
distributed (i.e., moderated or unmoderated), which we label under the umbrella term “platform design”. In
addition, we study the payment instruments, which are physical proxies of digital payment platforms in
regards to technology compatibility, which we label under the umbrella term “technology design”. Table 6
illustrates the findings from the studied cases. Key findings are that multi-sided payment platforms enter
into adjacent platform markets to exploit new business opportunities. In so doing, these market entries
simultaneously attempt to support and reinforce existing market positions in their core markets. For
instance, girogo, Orange, and Turkcell entered into the NFC service market, which, in turn, supports their
respective platforms, payment instruments (payment card and mobile phones), and, thus, their position in
their core markets. Lastly, evolutionary payment instruments that are compatible with existing
infrastructures in different platform markets help firms create positive platform-envelopment conditions
because they bridge users from core to adjacent platform markets. Payment as a service acts as the
binding glue to connect core and adjacent platform markets.
Table 6. The Design and Configuration of Eight Payment Platforms

Technology design

Platform design

Business design

Two-sided payment platforms
(Swish, Yapital, iZettle, Payleven)

Multi-sided payment platforms
(girogo, Orange, Turkcell, Flash‘N pay)

Platform market entry: NFC hub, marketing
The design and configuration of all multi-sided digital
Platform market entry: non-existent
payment platforms support conditions for platform
The design and the configuration of all two-sided
envelopment to enter other platform markets.
digital payment platforms do no support platform
envelopment. Accordingly, conditions to enter other
Identified markets:
platform markets are not given.
•
NFC Hub: girogo, Orange, Turkcell
•
Loyalty Marketing: Flash‘N pay
Platform development: closed (4x)
All two-sided payment platforms have a closed
development approach, hence excluding third
parties from co-development opportunities.

Platform development: closed (4x)
All multi-sided digital payment platforms have a closed
development approach, hence excluding third parties from
co-development opportunities.

Platform service distribution: moderated (2x)
Two of the two-sided payment platforms have a
moderated approach in regards to platform access
and service distribution:
•
Moderated: iZettle, Payleven

Platform service distribution: moderated (3x) &
unmoderated (1x)
Three of the four multi-sided payment platforms have a
moderated approach regarding platform access and
service distribution, and one is unmoderated:
•
Moderated: girogo, Orange, Turkcell
•
Unmoderated: Flash‘N pay

Evolutionary (2x) and revolutionary (2x)
Two of the two-sided payment platforms issue
evolutionary devices (i.e., SMS, QR code mobile
payment) that are compatible between payers and
payees. The other two-sided digital payment
platforms issue revolutionary devices (i.e., payment
dongles) that are incompatible on the payee side.
•
Revolutionary: iZettle and Payleven
•
Evolutionary: Swish and Yapital

Evolutionary (2x) and revolutionary (2x)
Two of the multi-sided payment platforms issue
evolutionary devices (i.e., NFC payment card, QR-Code
mobile payment) that are compatible between payers and
payees. The remaining multi-sided payment platforms
issue revolutionary devices (NFC mobile payment) that are
incompatible on the payee side.
•
Revolutionary: Orange, Turkcell
•
Evolutionary: girogo, Flash‘N pay

In Sections 6.1 to 6.2.3, we discuss the insights from the Table 6 about how technology and platform
design impact firms’ ability to enter other platform markets (i.e., business design).

6.1

Technology Design

Four of the eight payment platforms follow an evolutionary technology-design approach that supports
users to adopt new payment instruments with relatively low switching costs (Eisenmann et al., 2006;
Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Issuing evolutionary payment instruments, in turn, enables the platform owner to
extend the control over an existing user base. Furthermore, the findings suggest that industry background
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determines the type of payment instruments: new payment actors with no prior experiences in the
payment market (i.e., payment start-ups and mobile network operators) have the tendency to issue
revolutionary payment instruments. Contrary, actors with payment expertise in their daily operations (i.e.,
banks and merchants) support evolutionary payment instruments.
One can argue that banks and merchants prefer payment instruments that are highly compatible and
accessible with their current payment infrastructure to reduce adoption costs and, thus, reinforce existing
customer and business structures. Contrary, mobile network operators and payment start-ups issue
payment instruments that are relatively incompatible with the existing payment infrastructure, especially
on the payee side.
For instance, girogo’s NFC payment card is particularly evolutionary because it is highly compatible with
existing ATMs and chip and PIN payment terminals. On the other hand, payment solutions by the mobile
network operators and payment start-ups are incompatible with current chip and PIN payment terminals
on the payee side. One can argue that mobile network operators and payment start-ups pursue a
deliberate revolutionary technology design strategy to lock-in their newly created user bases. Banks and
merchants, on the other hand, pursue rather an evolutionary technology design strategy to maintain and
grow their existing user bases.

6.1.1

Implications for Business Design

Controlling and leveraging an existing user base is a precondition for platform envelopment. The findings
suggest that girogo and Flash N’ pay have created the best conditions for platform envelopment. These
two payment platforms equip their large and existing user bases on the payer and payee side with
accessible and evolutionary payment instruments, which creates conditions to bridge users into the NFC
hub market (girogo) or loyalty card market (Flash‘N pay). Payment platforms that issue revolutionary
payment instruments (i.e., mobile network operators, payment start-ups) face challenges in achieving
similar platform-envelopment conditions because they lack the access and leverage of an installed user
base, especially on the payee side. Additional findings suggest that the type of payment instruments
determine market accessibility in the first place. Payment instruments based on NFC are suitable to serve
contactless dominated markets, such as ticketing, which girogo illustrates (soccer season tickets).
Alternatively, QR code-based payment instruments are more amenable to optical reader- and displaydominated markets such as the (online) retail and marketing industry (see, for example, Flash‘N pay).
To summarize, using evolutionary payment instruments supports platform-envelopment conditions in
regards to technology design. Moreover, strategically choosing and using certain payment instruments
(e.g., NFC or QR codes) impacts firms’ platform-envelopment capabilities to enter specific markets.

6.2
6.2.1

Platform Design
Platform Development

The findings suggest that all eight payment platforms exercise closed platform development, which
provides monopolistic power about how their platforms advance regarding functionality and governance.
One can argue that a closed platform-development approach fulfills a firm’s need to exercise control over
current and future value streams, reduce platform and service fragmentation. Alternatively, payment
platforms simply lack organizational capabilities and resources to accommodate third parties. Lastly,
payment service providers are highly regulated organizations (e.g., anti-money-laundering laws, security),
which impacts the degree and number of platform co-development instances in the first place.

6.2.2

Platform Service Distribution

Six of the eight payment platforms offer platform access to third parties; however, the quality and type of
service distribution differs. Among the two-sided payment platforms, only payment start-ups practice
service distribution; however, payment start-ups exclude any service offered by third parties. More
specifically, payment start-ups grant rather co-distribution rights for their own payment services (i.e.,
moderated). For example, iZettle and Payleven authorize app developers to use their payment APIs,
which helps them to extend their footprint in the payment market.
Contrary, multi-sided payment platforms integrate and distribute third party services. These platforms
predominantly use a moderated service-distribution approach (e.g., see girogo, Orange, and Turkcell). A
moderated service-distribution approach may allow firms to select complementary services to increase
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overall platform value as with girogo (i.e., ticketing) and Turkcell (i.e., mobile location-based deals).
Flash‘N pay’s merchant solution differs. Flash‘N pay has an unmoderated service distribution approach
that does not require approval because Flash‘N pay grants one the freedom to store any loyalty card. This
kind of configuration may support Flash‘N pay’s intended data-collection efforts in the loyalty card market.
Our findings suggest that two-sided payment platforms primarily seek to operate and grow in the payment
market and, accordingly, support design measures to achieve these goals. Thus, two-sided payment
platforms are inherently designed and configured to operate in the payment market. Contrary, multi-sided
payment platforms are inherently designed and configured to support payment-unrelated services, which
corresponds with the notion of platform envelopment.

6.2.3

Implications for Business Design

To achieve platform-envelopment conditions on the platform-design level, payment platforms need the
necessary organizational and technical capabilities to incorporate and distribute payment-unrelated
services to a large user base. In this study, girogo and Flash‘N pay have created the best conditions for
platform envelopment on the platform design level. First, girogo and Flash‘N pay distribute paymentunrelated services to a ready-made user base. Second, girogo and Flash‘N pay effectively distribute their
payment unrelated services to their user base by leveraging accessible and evolutionary payment
instruments. Orange and Turkcell distribute payment-unrelated services as well. However, they do not
create platform-envelopment conditions as well as girogo and Flash‘N pay do because they issue
revolutionary payment instruments, which limits service delivery to existing users especially on the payee
side.
To summarize, closed platform development and moderated/unmoderated platform service distribution
are design options and configurations that support platform-envelopment conditions on the platformdesign level. The current design and configuration of two-sided payment platforms do not support
platform-envelopment conditions because they are purposefully designed to operate in the payment
market.

6.3

Theoretical and Practical Implications

We contribute to the literature on multi-sided platforms (Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2002,
2003a, 2003b, 2006), technology standards (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Tassey,
2000; West & Dedrick, 2000), and platform market entry (Eisenmann et al., 2011) by proposing a
framework to study the design and configuration of digital payment platforms and how these firms create
conditions for platform envelopment.
Our findings are novel in that they suggest that, due to technological advancements in the digital payment
space, one can conceptually extend the notion of two-sided payment platforms (i.e., single-purpose
platforms) (Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003a) to multi-sided payment platforms (i.e., multi-purpose platforms).
Multi-sided payment platforms can create platform-envelopment conditions through strategic design and
configurations while supporting multiple services. Our results illustrate that multi-sided payment platforms
create conditions for platform envelopment by leveraging on 1) evolutionary payments instruments and 2)
payment services as means to bridge users from core to adjacent platform markets. In so doing, core and
adjacent platform markets reciprocally support each other, which, in turn, strengthens firms’ market
positions in their respective core markets. We are not aware of prior work that has specifically studied the
design and configuration of digital payment platforms in terms of platform market entry. As such, this
paper provides a conceptual contribution to better describe and understand contemporary digital payment
platforms and their market-entry options. Moreover, we help practitioners make decisions by increasing
their awareness of different digital platform design and configurations options they have to enter other
platform markets. For instance, managers can evaluate strategies for alternative platform configurations
as digital payment platforms evolve and mature over time (e.g., extending their platform design towards
open and moderated to create a valuable platform ecosystem).

6.4

Future Research

Future research could study different payment platform design and configurations to understand
successful platform-envelopment strategies. Because our conceptual framework illustrates correlational
relationships among the platform elements, future research could study the causality between platform
governance, technology compatibility, and overlapping users to prescribe effective platform market
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entries. Lastly, research could also explore the different layers of payment platforms (Yoo et al., 2010).
Mobile payment platforms comprise various technology layers (which handset makers, app stores, and
communication networks provide) that may impact platform-envelopment capabilities.

6.5

Limitations

This paper has certain limitations. We adopt a platform-centric view, which does not cover an analysis
about users, in-depth hardware specifications, or security requirements that may have an impact on
market entries. Furthermore, because we only used triangulated data based on secondary sources, the
proposed framework does not create theoretical generalizability. Nevertheless, we believe that this paper
is a small but a concrete step to outline fruitful research avenues in the domain of multi-sided payment
platforms. Another aspect that may reduce the framework’s validity is that almost all presented cases
were in their pilot stages; thus, current settings (e.g., partnerships or technology) may change in the
future. In addition, we could not study actual clashes between different platforms and third party services
that may hijack customer relationships. Studying tensions would provide valuable insights into the
dynamics of platform control and platform envelopment.

7

Conclusion

This paper presents a conceptual framework that we distilled from existing literature to understand and
explain the design and configuration of digital payment platforms and how payment platforms create
conditions to enter other platform markets through platform envelopment. To provide an answer to our
research question, we performed a multiple and comparative-case study in a European setting by using
our framework as an analytical lens to identify similarities and differences among the cases. By
synthesizing our observations, we identify that digital payment platforms enter into adjacent platform
markets (i.e., business design), which is driven by platform design (i.e., platform development and service
distribution) and technology design (i.e., the issuance of evolutionary and revolutionary payment
instruments. The findings suggest that multi-sided payment platforms leverage on 1) evolutionary payment
instruments and 2) payment services as a means to bridge users from core to adjacent platform markets.
In so doing, platform envelopment strengthens firms’ market position in their respective core markets.
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